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322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
TOMMY CLAY ALEXANDER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44549
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2015-16334

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Tommy Clay Alexander pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
the district court sentenced him to seven years, with one and one-half years fixed.
Mr. Alexander appeals. He contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Alexander committed the crime
of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 372732(c). (R., pp.9–10; see also R., pp.27–28 (Amended Complaint).) According to the
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police report in the presentence materials, Mr. Alexander was stopped by the police
after an employee at a Tobacco Connection store reported a theft. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 pp.3, 86–87.) The employee believed Mr. Alexander had
taken some rolling papers. (PSI, p.87.) When the police approached Mr. Alexander, he
turned away and reportedly did not comply with the officers’ orders. (PSI, p.86.) The
police found a baggie containing methamphetamine in Mr. Alexander’s jacket pocket.
(PSI, pp.86, 87.)
Mr. Alexander waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over
to district court. (R., pp.29–31.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Alexander
with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.32–33.) Shortly thereafter, the State
moved for leave amend the Information to add additional charges from a previously
consolidated case, CR 2015-15619. (R., pp.16–17, 19, 38, 39–40.) The district court
granted the motion and dismissed CR 2015-15619. (R., pp.38, 46.) The State then filed
an Amended Information with two additional misdemeanor offenses for petit theft for the
rolling papers and resisting or obstructing officers. (R., pp.41–42.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Alexander pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance.2 (Tr. Vol. I,3 p.26, Ls.9–18, P.31, Ls.1–7.) The State agreed to
dismiss the misdemeanors. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, Ls.20–21, p.10, Ls.8–9.)
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 542-page document containing the confidential
exhibits.
2
The State also filed a Second Amended Information to fix clerical errors. (R., pp.66–
67.)
3
There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of
plea hearing, held on July 28, 2016. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the
sentencing hearing, held on September 29, 2016.
2

Consistent with the plea agreement, the State recommended a sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.1–5.) Mr. Alexander requested
the district court place him on probation, with an underlying sentence of five years, with
one year fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.8–11.) He also requested the district court require
that he participate in mental health treatment at Intermountain Hospital as a specific
condition of probation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15, Ls.18–24.) The district court sentenced him to
seven years, with one and one-half years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.22, Ls.13–18.) The district
court declined to retain jurisdiction or place Mr. Alexander on probation. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.22, Ls.13–18.)
Mr. Alexander filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.77–79, 82–83.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with one and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Alexander, following his guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven
Years, With One And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Alexander, Following His Guilty
Plea To Possession Of A Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Alexander’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (maximum
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of seven years imprisonment). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Mr. Alexander “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho
457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011). “The choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho
613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
Here, Mr. Alexander asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he
contends the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment
or placed him on probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his mental health
and substance abuse issues.
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s
mental health condition if it is a significant factor, and the record must show that the
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sentencing court adequately considered this factor when imposing a sentence.
I.C. § 19-2523; Delling, 152 Idaho at 132–33. In addition, a sentencing court should give
“proper consideration of the defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the
problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the
defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon
sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981).
In this case, Mr. Alexander has significant mental health issues, which were
undoubtedly exacerbated by years of substance abuse. Mr. Alexander started using
drugs at a very young age, smoking marijuana at age ten and using methamphetamine,
cocaine, prescription medications, hallucinogens, and heroin by age fourteen. (PSI,
p.14.) This substance abuse continued throughout his life. (PSI, pp.22–23, 105, 222,
463.) It seems that Mr. Alexander’s methamphetamine use, his drug of choice, had the
greatest impact on his mental health. (PSI, pp.14, 18, 20, 22; see also PSI, pp.72 (2015
hospital summary noting methamphetamine-induced psychosis), 393 (2014 hospital
summary noting cognitive issues due to methamphetamine use).) Mr. Alexander
injected methamphetamine daily “for many years, since 2003.” (PSI, p.20.) Due in part
to his drug use, Mr. Alexander has been diagnosed with schizophrenic, bipolar,
antisocial personality, mood, and anxiety disorders. (PSI, pp.16, 20, 31, 48, 283, 386,
478, 530.) The district court issued two orders of commitment to treat Mr. Alexander’s
mental condition during the proceedings. (R., pp.23–24, 49–50.) By the time of
sentencing, however, Mr. Alexander’s mental health condition had stabilized. The
second discharge summary from the Idaho State Hospital noted that Mr. Alexander
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“expressed forward thinking including a desire to continue his prescribed medication as
an outpatient.” (PSI, p.56.) Similarly, the mental health evaluation found that
Mr. Alexander’s responses indicated “high motivation for treatment.” (PSI, p.32.)
Mr. Alexander also reported to the presentence investigator that he “really wants to get
off drugs this time.” (PSI, p.14.) Moreover, Mr. Alexander’s attorney noted that once
Mr. Alexander returned from the Idaho State Hospital, he maintained his medication and
resided in the medical unit of the Ada County Jail. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.2–5.) If placed on
probation, Mr. Alexander planned to admit himself to Intermountain Hospital for a 29day inpatient program in order to continue his substance abuse and mental health
treatment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.13–24, p.17, Ls.13–25.) His commitment to treatment is
evidenced by his request that the Intermountain Hospital program be included as a
specific condition of his probation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15, Ls.21–24.) In light of
Mr. Alexander’s substance abuse and mental health issues, as well as his commitment
to manage these issues, he submits the district court abused its discretion by failing to
give adequate weight to the mitigating circumstances at sentencing.
Finally, Mr. Alexander submits his family situation also stands in favor of
mitigation. Mr. Alexander’s parents live in Tennessee. (PSI, p.11.) His father, who was
ninety-eight years old at the time of sentencing, recently had a stroke, and
Mr. Alexander hoped to visit his father to “say his good-byes” and mourn with his family.
(PSI, p.11; Tr. Vol. II, p.15, Ls.9–16.) This information also supports a lesser sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Alexander respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that his case be remanded to
the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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